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T
he global financial crisis has come to be
seen not only as the most severe financial
and economic debacle since the Great Dep  -
ression of the 1930s. It also, according to many
commentators, marks a fiasco in terms of how
central banking has been perceived after the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Central
banking will never be the way it was before
2007, many believe. 
Criticism has been aired that the focus of cen-
tral banks on short-term inflation forecasts has
turned out to be flawed and that the monetary
laxity of the past is one of the root causes of
the crisis in that it encouraged risk taking and
contributed to the build-up of financial imbal-
ances and asset price bubbles. Moreover, there
are views that hard-earned central bank inde-
pendence has ultimately been sacrificed since
central banks have coordinated policies close-
ly with fiscal authorities in forestalling a major
economic and financial collapse.
True, the liquidity measures taken by the ECB
were unthinkable, if measured by how the
Euro  system was designed to function. The ECB
provided unlimited liquidity support to banks
against less liquid collateral, it purchased gov-
ernments and private sector debt in secondary
markets and it cut its policy interest rates to lows
not seen in generations so as to be able to pre-
vent the financial system from seizing up and to
avoid the emergence of deflationary risks.
On top of all this, the ECB was involved in
drawing up adjustment programs in the con-
text of the sovereign debt crisis for countries
that had to apply for financial help from their
European partners and the IMF. Finally, since
the beginning of this year, the ECB has been
supporting the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) in the monitoring of systemic risk that
may arise from the macroeconomic environ-
ment and from within the financial system. 
However, all these developments have not
changed the ECB’s core task. The ECB’s pri-
mary mandate is to safeguard price stability. It
is indisputable that the financial crisis has
shown the shortcomings of inflation targeting
strategies that focus unduly on short-term
inflation forecasts and neglect developments
in the financial sector. In this respect, the ECB
has always based its monetary policy decisions
on a broad set of indicators, including devel-
opments in money and credit, with a view 
to pursuing price stability over medium-term
horizons. It was on the basis of this strategy
that it had warned about the risks emerging
from double-digit growth rates in money and
credit, as observed well ahead of the crisis. 
The majority of the countries participating in
EMU are now about to overcome the econom-
ic and budgetary consequences of the crisis.
The economic recovery in the euro area has
been sustained and is becoming more broadly
based. The economy no longer needs the
degree of economic or monetary stimulus that
had been adopted at the height of the crisis in
late 2008 and early 2009. Inflation, expressed
in terms of the EU’s Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices, is currently higher than the
level that the ECB would consider to be in line
with price stability. Financial asset prices are
now virtually back to where they were before
the crisis. 
The ECB has taken account of these develop-
ments and allowed most of its liquidity sup-
port measures to expire. As exemplified by the
decline in the size of its balance sheet, it has
gradually been stepping back from the promi-
nent role it has played as an intermediary in
the interbank market. Likewise, it has started
to withdraw monetary stimulus by raising
interest rates in April 2011. 
The challenges that appear to have rocked 
the world of central banking in the view of
many observers have, in fact, been confronted
by central banks before – especially that of
operating independently of political influence
and ensuring price stability in an environment
of highly vulnerable public finances. 
It is clear that the ECB does not operate in a
political vacuum. But any blurring of respon-
sibilities between national governments and
the ECB would be detrimental. Addressing
sovereign debt problems is outside the remit 
of central banking, and this must remain so, if
the euro is to continue to be a sound currency.
If countries want to reap the benefits of EMU
participation, they need to come to terms with
the reality of a sound common European 
currency managed by an independent central
bank. 
EDITORIAL
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WHY DOES THE EQUALLY WEIGHTED PORTFOLIO OUTPERFORM 
THE VALUE- AND PRICE-WEIGHTED PORTFOLIOS?
I
nvestors are traditionally searching for
“alpha”, defined as a return in excess of
that warranted by the systematic risk
undertaken, and managers are tradition-
ally evaluated on the basis of their ability
to beat the market, preferably without
being exposed to significant risks. Several
years ago, the financial industry faced a
puzzling result of DeMiguel, Garlappi,
and Uppal (2009) that the performance of
the equally weighted equity portfolio is
no worse than that of a number of opti-
mal portfolio choice models. As its name
would imply, the equally weighted port-
folio divides the investment among the
assets equally, and hence it is one of the
simplest investment rules available to
portfolio managers. While being simple,
the equally weighted portfolio outper-
forms the traditional value- and price-
weighted portfolios in terms of Sharpe
ratio and Jensen's alpha (see the compar-
ative performance of the three sample
portfolios over the last 40 years in figure 1).
Responding to the interest shown by the in  -
vestment community, we analyze three of the
simplest weighting rules (for an equally, value-
and price-weighted portfolio) to understand
what features of the equally weighted portfolio
account for its consistent outperformance. In
our conversations with colleagues, we often
hear that the explanation is obvious − the
equal-weighting rule assigns higher weights to
small stocks compared to the weights of the
same stocks in the value- and price-weighted
portfolios. Embracing this idea, we look at the
composition of each portfolio in terms of stock
characteristics that have been shown to predict
cross-sectional returns. Moreover, we look at
the systematic risk of each weighting rule to
understand how much of the performance can
be attributed to the bearing of systematic risk
and how much is idiosyncratic. To determine
the source of the idiosyncratic return compo-
nent, we also look at the distinctive feature of
the equal-weighting − periodic rebalancing of
the stocks in order to maintain equal weights.
Thus, our analysis studies three underlying
channels through which the weighting rule
may affect the performance of a portfolio: (i)
the cross-sectional relation between stock char-
acteristics and expected returns; (ii) the system-
atic risk of the equally weighted portfolio in
terms of factor exposure and its relation to the
remaining idiosyncratic risk; and (iii) the con-
trarian nature of the equally weighted portfolio
relative to the trend-following behavior of the
value- and price-weighted portfolios. 
To undertake our analysis, we construct equal-,
value- and price-weighted portfolios from the
stock constituents of three U.S. stock indices −
the S&P500, the S&P400, and the S&P600,
which contain large-cap, mid-cap and small-cap
stocks, respectively. We then compare the per-
formance of these portfolios and find that the
equally weighted portfolio consistently outper-
forms the price-weighted portfolio, which, in
turn, outperforms the value-weighted portfolio
in terms of four-factor alpha, average return,
Sharpe ratio, and certainty equivalent. 
In brief, the picture is rather more complicated
than that predicted by our colleagues − small
stocks definitely help explain some of the good
performance of the equally weighted portfolios,
but they do not tell the whole story. We find
that there are three major performance drivers
of the equally weighted portfolio, compared to
the price- and value-weighted portfolios.
Raman Uppal  
EDHEC Business School
Yuliya Plyakha 
Goethe University
Grigory Vilkov 
Goethe University
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(i) A larger proportion of relatively small stocks,
high book-to-market stocks, and stocks character-
ized by more pronounced reversal (defined as the
return in the past month).
The equally weighted portfolio assigns rela-
tively higher weights to smaller stocks than the
value- and price-weighted portfolios. Because
of the fact that the stocks of smaller companies
have historically tended to earn higher returns
than those of larger companies, the equally
weighted portfolio outperforms portfolios with
a higher proportion of large-cap stocks. A vast
amount of empirical literature (e. g., Fama and
French (1992), among others) has shown that
other company and stock characteristics are also
linked to stock returns. We find that, in addi-
tion to size, price, liquidity and idiosyncratic
volatility also account for why equally weight-
ed portfolios demonstrate a superior perform-
ance to value- and price-weighted portfolios. 
(ii) A different exposure to the systematic factors
and a greater proportion of the idiosyncratic port-
folio return with respect to and beyond the three
factors of Fama and French (1993) and the momen-
tum factor of Carhart (1997).
To understand how the weighting is related to
the risk profile, we look at the differences in the
exposure of our portfolios to the standard mar-
ket, size (“small-minus-big”) and value (“high-
minus-low”) factors of Fama and French (1993),
as well as to the momentum factor of Carhart
(1997). We find that the different weighted port-
folios do indeed differ in their exposure to these
factors. As expected from the analysis of charac-
teristics, the equally weighted portfolio loads
more positively on the size and value factors,
and more negatively on the momentum factor,
compared to the value-weighted and price-
weighted portfolios. However, the change in
exposure to the systematic factors does not fully
explain the differences in the expected/average
realized returns of each type of portfolio. 
(iii) The contrarian nature of the equally weighted
portfolio that arises due to the periodic rebalancing
of stocks required for equal weights.
To complete the picture, we examine the
effect on performance of the contrarian
nature of the equally weighted portfolio rela-
tive to the trend-following behavior of the
value- and price-weighted portfolios. We find
that the contrarian nature of the equally
weighted portfolio is important for its per-
formance, and that the rebalancing period is
a crucial factor determining the alpha of the
equally weighted versus the value- and price-
weighted portfolios. The ability of the equal-
ly weighted rule to take advantage of the
reversal in prices is responsible for beating
the factor models, i. e., for generating the fac-
tor alpha of the strategy. 
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Figure 1: Performance of an equally weighted portfolio compared to a value- and a price-weighted portfolio
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he Solvency II project has been in the
making since 2001. With this, the
European legislator seeks to reform the pres-
ent insurance supervisory regime of the
European Union in order to create a frame-
work that is more risk-based, more trans-
parent, and that allows for rules to be
applied and amended more flexibly. It
involves major innovations in three areas: (i)
the calculation of capital requirements, i.e.
the amount of capital that an insurance
undertaking has to maintain in order to
cover the risks inherent in its business
(“quantitative” requirements); (ii) the rules
regarding the governance system of the
undertaking and also the activities of super-
visory authorities (“qualitative” require-
ments); and (iii) the supervisory reporting
and public disclosure duties of an insurance
undertaking.
Solvency II is implemented using the so-called
“Lamfalussy process”, a special legislative tech-
nique. It aims – generally speaking – at laying
down a regulatory issue in different legal
statutes. Thus, it allows for essential basic reg-
ulation to be stipulated in a framework direc-
tive (the first level of the process) and for more
detailed technical rules to be incorporated 
into regulations or directives by the European
Commission that are easier to amend (the sec-
ond level). As to its legislative part, it is envis-
aged that the Solvency II project will be finalized
on a preliminary basis by 1 January 2013.
Thereafter, the Solvency II Directive adopted
in 2009, as well as the more detailed technical
rules that are currently being developed by the
Commission, will become applicable. 
PRINCIPLES-BASED LAW: A CHALLENGE FOR
INSURERS AND SUPERVISORS
A major change is that future rules will follow
a so-called “principles-based” approach. Contrary
to the present rules-based regulation, which is
primarily governed by detailed statutes, princi-
ples-based law is essentially characterized by
the utilization of general, vague legal terms,
such as “adequate” or “proportionate”. The ap  -
proach seeks to grant the supervisory authori-
ties more leeway in the application of the law
and to allow for greater flexibility, so that all
the circumstances of a particular case, espe-
cially the individual business model of the insur-
er  and its unique risk profile, may be given
ample consideration. Due to this legislative
shift, the legal objectives of Solvency II gain
great importance, since they will serve to deter-
mine the scope and content of a principles-
based provision. Moreover, principles-based
rules need to be applied in a proportionate
manner, vigilantly taking into consideration the
various aspects and particularities of the indi-
vidual case. Hence, for the successful design and
application of future Solvency II rules, it is of
utmost importance that all the authorities con-
cerned give due consideration to the underlying
legal objectives and the proportionality princi-
ple. Regrettably, the Solvency II Directive raises
a number of questions in this regard.  
WHAT ARE THE LEGAL OBJECTIVES OF SOLVENCY II?
The Directive explicitly names the “protection
of policyholders and beneficiaries” as the main
objective of insurance supervision. The term
“supervision” encompasses both supervisory
regulation as well as the application of the
Solvency II rules by supervisory authorities. In
addition to the main objective, the Directive
explicitly mentions other so-called “secondary
objectives”, i. e. financial stability and the 
prevention of procyclical effects. Thus, even
SOLVENCY II: PRINCIPLES-BASED LAW, LEGAL OBJECTIVES AND
PROPORTIONALITY
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supervisory authorities remain restricted to
insurance undertakings, the European legisla-
tor has also assigned to them the responsibili-
ty for safeguarding other financial sectors and
the financial system, as a whole. It comes as a
surprise that, even though policyholder pro-
tection is defined as the main objective, the
Directive refrains from prescribing the con-
crete level of protection that the supervisory
authority has to safeguard (e. g. minimum,
optimum, or, as in Sec. 81 para. 1 s. 2 of the
German Insurance Supervision Act, sufficient
protection). Thus, the Member States seem to
be empowered – at least to a certain degree –
to set a national level of protection them-
selves, which does not exactly foster regulato-
ry convergence throughout the EU.
SOLVENCY II AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
The successful implementation and applica-
tion of Solvency II is contingent on proper
observance of the proportionality principle.
Provided that the Solvency II Directive is itself
proportionate, the principle of proportionality
has two additional areas of application: (i) in
the design of legislation by the Commission at
the second level of the Lamfalussy process;
and (ii) in the application of the Solvency II
provisions by supervisory authorities. In this
regard, the Directive raises a number of ques-
tions, e. g. what criteria should be taken into
consideration? On the one hand, Art. 29 sec. 3
stipulates that the Solvency II rules are to be
applied in a manner proportionate to the
“nature, scale and complexity of the risks
inherent in the business”, indicating that only
the insurer’s risk profile has to be considered.
However, on the other, Art. 29 sec. 4 obligates
the Commission to ensure “the proportionate
application of this Directive, in particular to
small insurance undertakings”, implying that
the undertaking’s size is also to be taken into
account. This may cause severe problems,
such as in the case of a small undertaking with
a complex risk profile that seeks permission to
use certain simplifications, e. g. regarding the
calculation formula for its capital require-
ments or the complexity of its governance sys-
tem. The question then arises whether the
insurer can be allowed such simplifications on
the basis of the proportionality principle.
REFERENCES
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Figure 1: The 3 pillar approach of Solvency II
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I
n the financial services industry,
employees have access to a large
amount of information that is provided
by enterprise IT systems. In such an envi-
ronment, too much information can lead
to information overload. The negative
consequences of information overload can
be counteracted by a high degree of cog-
nitive mindfulness among the users of
these systems. Hence, we analyze the
interplay between information overload
and mindfulness with regard to the real-
ization of business process outcomes. The
results suggest that the presence of infor-
mation overload decreases the use of IT
systems and reduces the overall business
process outcome. However, we also find
that cognitive capabilities in the form of
mindfulness can mitigate the negative
consequences of information overload.
The ever-increasing availability of digitized in  -
formation in financial organizations demands
an increased cognitive processing capability on
the part of employees in order to master the
difficult task of dealing with all of this informa-
tion. In extreme cases, if the information load
or time constraints are too high and the cogni-
tive processing capabilities present too low, a
situation of information overload is likely to
occur. While the extant literature posits a
strong positive relationship between informa-
tion load, information processing and decision
quality, there is also evidence that information
overload can counteract the possible gains to
be derived from using IT systems (Edmunds
and Morris 2000). The prospect of information
overload decreases the likelihood of using an
enterprise IT system and of realizing the busi-
ness value related to its use. Consequently,
cognitive capabilities are required to meet the
challenge of information overload. Among
such capabilities, individual mindfulness is
assumed to account for the effective processing
of context-relevant information in highly
dynamic industries (Dane 2010). In essence,
mindfulness reflects a state of high situational
awareness and contextualized decision making
(Langer 1989) that is required to realize busi-
ness value from complex enterprise IT systems. 
In order to validate the hypothesized relation-
ships between enterprise systems use, infor-
mation overload, mindfulness and business
process outcomes, we conducted a question-
naire-based study of 489 professionals from
the sales department of a large German finan-
cial services provider. In their place of work, a
new customer relationship management (CRM)
system was implemented whose subsequent
use was mandatory to all employees. The
results of partial least squares (PLS) analyses
based on 221 complete responses indicate that
use of the new CRM system serves to increase
business process outcomes in terms of flexibil-
ity, effectiveness, and efficiency.
Employees that are exposed to a high degree
of information overload are more likely to
avoid using the IT system, as this would lead to
an even higher information load. As a result,
for such users, the costs associated with using
the IT system may outweigh the related bene-
fits, thereby decreasing the probability of
reuse. Conse  quently, we propose the follow-
ing hypotheses.
H1: Information overload negatively influences the
use of the enterprise system.
The literature suggests focusing on the analy-
sis of business value at the process level, since
EMPLOYING INDIVIDUAL MINDFULNESS TO MITIGATE INFORMATION
OVERLOAD IN FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
Roman Beck
Goethe University
Timm Pintner 
Goethe University
Martin Wolf
Goethe University
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level first. The extent to which using IT pro-
vides banks with more flexibility, effectiveness
and efficiency is reflected in the increase in
business process outcomes. Consequently, we
propose hypothesis two below.
H2: The use of the enterprise system positively
influences business process outcomes.
A high degree of information overload, as rep-
resented by a high information load, can
thwart the positive effects of IT use. Prior
research indicates that information overload
eventually leads to a situation where less
information is utilized. Additionally, informa-
tion overload has a direct negative effect on
the quality of decision making and the time
that this requires. This adversely affects poten-
tial business process outcomes, e. g. a large
amount of available information can increase
the time-to-market for new financial products
since it takes longer to process all the available
data. 
H3: Information overload negatively impacts busi-
ness process outcomes.
At the level of the individual user, the extant
management literature indicates that mindful-
ness positively influences individual task per-
formance, especially in complex and dynamic
settings. More precisely, individual mindful-
ness facilitates the identification and creation
of contextually relevant material, i. e. based on
all the information available. Through these
mechanisms, mindfulness is likely to increase
the benefits realized from enterprise IT sys-
tems where usage is negatively affected by
information overload.
H4a: Individual mindfulness negatively mo  derates
the relationship between information overload and
enterprise systems use.
H4b: Individual mindfulness negatively moderates
the relationship between information overload and
business process outcomes.
Since individual mindfulness is reflected in a
consideration of new, alternative solutions and
a highly context-dependent systems use, a
close matching of business requirements and
utilized IT capabilities is more likely, leading
eventually to the improved business process
outcomes that arise from IT utilization (Wolf et
al., 2010). Usually, firms that exhibit a high
extent of mindfulness are likely to achieve
superior organizational performance. 
H4c: Individual mindfulness positively moderates 
the relationship between enterprise systems use
and business process outcomes.
Overall, four (H1, H2, H3, H4b) of the six
hypotheses are supported by the results (see
Figure 1). The estimated explained variance
(R²) for the endogenous latent variables
adjusted R² values of 0.215 for enterprise 
systems use (USE) and 0.301 for business
process outcomes (BPO) indicate a moderate
amount of explained variance. Information
overload negatively affects usage of the CRM
system in a twofold way. First, it has a direct
negative impact on the actual use of the CRM
system itself. Second, it negatively affects the
business process outcomes realized from
using the CRM system. Finally, this relation-
ship is moderated by individual mindfulness
indicating that the presence of mindfulness
among the CRM system’s users helps mitigate
the possible negative consequences of infor-
mation over  -load on the benefits realized
from its use. Surprisingly, we find no evi-
dence of mindfulness having a moderating
impact on the business process outcomes
generated by enterprise IT systems use and of
decreased system use due to higher levels of
information overload.
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Figure 1: Estimates for the research model − * p< .05 (two-tailed)
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T
he flash-crash of the U.S. stock
market on May 6, 2010 has drawn
massive public attention to High
Frequency Trading (HFT). The use of
computers in trading processes has
enabled market participants to dra  -
matically speed up the reception of mar-
ket data, internal strategy calculation
procedures, order submission and the
reception of execution confirmations in
recent years. A remarkable gap between
the results of academic research on 
HFT and its perceived impact on mar-
kets in the public, media and regulatory
discussions can be observed. While regu-
lators around the globe are discussing
whether there is a need for regulatory
intervention into HFT activities, aca-
demic literature mostly finds positive
effects of HFT based strategies on mar-
ket quality. Our study provides an
overview of the evolution of electronic
trading as well as definitions and a
delineation of Algorithmic Trading (AT)
and HFT. Based on this background, 
we analyze the benefits and risks of
HFT and discuss appropriate regulatory
measures. 
HFT is used by technologically advanced 
market participants to implement their trad-
ing strategies in a high speed technological
environment. HFT is therefore not a trading
strategy in itself, but rather uses the latest
technological advances in market access,
market data access and order routing to
maximize the returns of established trading
strategies. While HFT is a relatively new
term, the underlying concept is not new at
all. Since the advent of electronic markets,
market participants have tried to minimize
trading costs and to maximize their profits
from electronic executions. From the first
quote machines, to direct market access
tools, to smart order routing systems, there is
a clear evolutionary process in market par-
ticipants’ adoption of new technologies in
changing market environments, triggered by
competition, innovation and regulation.
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING IN ACADEMIC 
LITERATURE
The most prominent question regarding 
HFT is whether it is beneficial or harmful 
to the economy. Since academic interest in
HFT is a relatively recent phenomenon, only
few studies exist. Furthermore, empirical
research on HFT is restricted by a lack of acces-
sible and reliable data. More research on this
topic is highly desirable.
The available literature shows that HFT gener-
ally contributes to price formation and finds
positive effects on liquidity and short term
volatility (e. g. Brogaard 2010 and Groth 2011).
Under certain circumstances, HFT has, however,
also been found to increase the adverse selection
problem and, in the case of the flash crash, one
study documents that HFT exacerbated volatil-
ity (see Jovanovic and Menkveld 2010). 
REGULATION OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING
BASED STRATEGIES
One argument commonly put forward when
discussing potential issues emanating from
the propagation of HFT is potential systemic
risk arising from the activity. Such risks can
be the result of malfunctioning/ rogue algo-
rithms, which bombard a marketplace with
orders until the marketplace’s infrastructure
is no longer able to cope with the amount of
orders. The new possibilities of sophisticated
IT can also be used to run abusive strategies
against market integrity or to deliberately
exercise disruptive or confusing effects on
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING – A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
Peter Gomber  
Goethe University
Björn Arndt  
Goethe University
Marco Lutat
Goethe University
Tim Uhle
Goethe University
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effectively combated by market regulation
and supervision. However, any arguments
that try to associate or equate HFT based
strategies with market abuse miss the point;
there is no ground for treating entities that
are applying HFT different to other market
participants in this respect. 
Regulatory authorities should require entities
running HFT based strategies to establish
sophisticated risk management tools and opera-
tional safeguards. Users should be able to
demonstrate that they are in full control of their
algorithms at any time, for instance by logging
and recording the algorithms’ input and output
parameters for supervisory investigations and
back testing. Furthermore, the authorities
should require market operators as well as
clearing & settlement organizations to be able to
handle peak volumes and to be capable of pro-
tecting themselves against technical failures in
members’ algorithms, for instance by requiring
that a human trader, responsible for the algo-
rithm, is always available during trading hours.
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
After the flash crash, a lot of regulatory
changes relating to HFT were introduced 
in the U.S. In contrast, Europe is only in initial
discussions whether and how to regulate HFT
strategies. A lot of problems relating to HFT are
rooted in the U.S. market structure, the U.S.
equity markets and the U.S. National Market
System. In Europe, where a more flexible best
execution regime is implemented by MiFID
(European Commission 2004) and where a
share-by-share volatility safeguard regime has
been in place for nearly two decades, no mar-
ket quality problems related to HFT have been
documented so far. Because of these differ-
ences, a European approach to the subject
matter is required and Europe should be cau-
tious when addressing and fixing a problem
that exists in a different market structure,
thereby creating risks for market efficiency
and market quality.
Any regulatory interventions in Europe
should attempt to preserve the benefits of HFT
while mitigating the risks as far as possible by
assuring that (i) a diversity of trading strategies
prevails and that artificial systemic risks are
prevented, (ii) economic rationale rather than
obligations drives the willingness of traders to
act as HFT liquidity providers, (iii) co-location
and proximity services are implemented on a
level playing field, (iv) instead of market mak-
ing obligations for HFT or minimum quote
lifetimes, the focus is on the alignment of
volatility safeguards among European trading
venues that reflect the HFT reality and ensure
that all investors are able to adequately react
in times of market stress.
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THE RISK OF COMPROMISING ON PRICE STABILITY 
MUST NOT BE TAKEN
Norbert Walter was
Chief Economist of
Deutsche Bank Group
from 1990 to 2009 and
also Head of Deutsche
Bank Research. For  -
merly a student of
Goethe University
Frank  furt and a re  -
search assistant at
the Institut für Ka  -
pital  markt  forschung (today’s Center for
Financial Studies), he received his Ph.D.
in Economics in 1971. From 1971 to 1986
he was a researcher at the Institut für Welt  -
wirtschaft in Kiel, earning his professor-
ship in 1978. In January 2010 he founded
Walter & Daughters Consult.
The ECB’s policy to buy the government bonds
of highly indebted EU Member States is widely
disputed. Do you share the opinion of Jean-
Claude Trichet that there was no alternative to
this measure?
I rarely dissent with Jean-Claude Trichet’s
views. However, concerning the purchase of
bonds that are at risk of being downgraded
because of unsustainable fiscal policy, I do. The
ECB is responsible for the provision of “last”
liquidity. If solvency is at stake, the lender of
last resort must be a government or, finally, a
parliament. The risk of compromising on price
stability must not be taken. While it is obvious
that, in an emergency, quick action must be
taken − and fiscal policy decisions are not
always swift − one could have sympathy for
asking the central bank to step in because this
can act promptly. But this is not a good enough
argument. The very fact that the Bank of
Japan, the Bank of England and the Federal
Reserve have purchased much higher sums of
low quality assets does not make this argument
any better. Not to be misunderstood – I do not
share the market assessment of the risk premia
for the government bonds of the PIIGS
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain).
Admittedly, proper premia were not as low as
the market had assessed before 2008. But
today’s high risk premia are also unreasonable,
particularly given that most of the peripheral
countries have addressed their fiscal imbal-
ances so aggressively.
Regarding a possible “haircut” on Greek gov-
ernment debt: Who will foot the bill − the finan-
cial industry or the tax payer?
If we are talking about a possible haircut, it is
obvious that this is about the private sector tak-
ing part of the “hit” instead of the government
and the tax payer footing the bill all alone.
However, to judge a certain action − here, a
haircut − it would be wise to consider several
rounds of responses rather than just the impact
effect, i.e. the first round. If a sizeable haircut
were to wipe out the equity capital of some
banks and insurance companies, and, if the
capital markets were not to recover to swiftly
recapitalize these financial institutions, the “too
big to fail” doctrine could lead to the necessity
of another financial market bailout. Thus, in
the complete analysis, the haircut, i. e. the
inclusion of the private sector to foot the
“Greek” bill, would not have worked. The tax
payer would pay; not for Greece, but for the
banks.
To avoid further debt crises in the future, EU
Member States recently agreed on a reform of
the Stability and Growth Pact. Lacking auto-
matic sanctions, was this reform worth the
effort?
The short and longer term rescue packages are
still incomplete. The Stability and Growth Pact,
while amended, has not reached safer shores.
The lack of effective sanctions is certainly a
major weakness. Thus, the inclusion of experi-
enced players in such operations − particularly
to ensure that the conditionality of the interna-
tional assistance proves effective − is highly
necessary; a fact barely understood after the
demise of Lehman Brothers.
The new President of the Deutsche Bundes  -
bank, Jens Weidmann, demanded a deficit
reduction from the German government. How
realistic was this appeal, given that Berlin has
to pay 22 billion euros into the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) during the next
five years?
The request for further deficit reduction is obvi-
ously appropriate, not just for Germany, but
because of the structural deficit − resulting
mainly from a negative demographic outlook −
for quite a number of other European coun-
tries. The need to fund the ESM makes such
efforts on the part of Germany even more rele-
vant. Given the positive surprise encountered
by the German Finance Minister regarding tax
revenues − a consequence of the healthy econ-
omy in 2011 − a further reduction in the
German government deficit seems to be achiev-
able at this point in time.
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GERMAN CHANCELLOR AT THE
HOUSE OF FINANCE
Angela Merkel visited the House of Finance on
March 23 to deliver a speech at the “Frankfurt
Finance Summit 2011 – Smarter Regulation,
Safer Markets”. The German Chancellor spoke
to a distinguished audience of decision makers
from politics, the public sector, academia, and
the financial industry about necessary reforms
for financial markets regulation. The Summit’s
opening speech was given by Jean-Claude
Trichet, the President of the European Central
Bank. Meanwhile, the keynote speakers of the
four panels held were Axel Weber, then
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Luc
Frieden, Luxembourg’s Minister of Finance,
Reto Francioni, the Chief Executive Officer of
Deutsche Börse, and EU elder statesman
Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy. Closing remarks
were made by Josef Ackermann, Chairman of
the Management Board and the Group
Executive Committee of Deutsche Bank. The
Summit was organized by Frankfurt Main
Finance and the Frankfurt Institute for Risk
Management in cooperation with the House
of Finance. 
GOETHE UNIVERSITY ESTABLISHES 
“HOUSE OF FINANCE FOUNDATION”
On March 23, Werner Müller-Esterl, the Pre  sident of Goethe University, announced the estab-
lishment of a “House of Finance Foun  da  tion” at the annual meeting of the HoF Board of Trustees.
The Foundation will start with an endowment of 12 million euros in free capital, three funded
chairs, and more than 5 million euros from existing assurances to the HoF; all of which together
are worth 21 million euros. President Müller-Esterl expressed his thanks not only to Deutsche
Bank, DekaBank, DZ Bank, Deutsche Vermögensberatung, Landes  bank Hessen-Thüringen as
well as to Bankhaus Metzler, UBS, and the Gesamt  verband der Deutschen Versicherungs  wirt  -
schaft, but also to the Mayor of Frankfurt and the government of Hesse for their continuing
support. Future talks with further potential donors should expand the Foundation’s capital stock.
STEFAN GERLACH TO ADVISE
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK
BOARD
Stefan Gerlach, Executive Di  rector
of the Institute for Monetary and
Financial Sta  bility (IMFS) and
Pro  fessor of Monetary Econo  mics
at the House of Fi  nan  ce, has been
appointed a member of the Advisory Scientific
Committee (ASC) of the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB). The ASC consists of 15
experts who provide advice and assistance on
issues relevant to the work of the ESRB at the
request of the Chair of the General Board.
Members are appointed for a renewable term
of four years. 
FIRST CORPORATE FINANCE
AWARD PRESENTED
On May 26, the business daily Börsen-Zeitung
presented its first Corporate Finance Award to
Merckle Group in recognition of their portfo-
lio rebuilding and their financial restructuring.
The award was bestowed during the Corporate
Finance Summit jointly organized by the
Commerzbank and the Institute for Law and
Finance (ILF) at the House of Finance. Andreas
Cahn, Professor at the ILF, was a member
of the jury. This had to consider a shortlist
of five strategically and financially exception-
al transactions or restructurings; all of which
had taken place in 2010 and proven outstand-
ing in terms of size, complexity, speed, and
originality.
SWEDISH MINISTER OF FINANCE
A GUEST OF THE IMFS  
On May 18, Anders Borg, Sweden’s
Mi  nister of Finance, gave a speech
on "Ensu  ring Fiscal and Financial
Stability in Europe – Lessons from
Sweden" at the Hessische Lan  des  -
vertretung in Berlin at the invitation of the
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
(IMFS). After a few words of welcome by Luise
Hölscher from the government of Hesse, Borg
outlined the Swedish success story. He explained
how a nation that was previously a severe debtor
could become one of the most fiscally sound
countries in Europe by means of surplus targets,
expenditure ceilings, balance requirements,
and a stringent budget controlling process.
Jörg Asmussen, State Secre  tary in the German
Ministry of Finance, attended the event on
behalf of the German Government.
VOLKER WIELAND A LEAD
SPEAKER AT G20 HIGH-LEVEL
SEMINAR
On March 31, Volker Wieland,
Professor of Monetary Theory and
Policy at the House of Finance,
was invited to be a lead speaker at
the G20 High-Level Seminar on
the international monetary system in Nanjing,
China. He contributed to the session on global
liquidity management issues with a speech on
"Liquidity Management and the Reform of the
International Monetary System". This seminar
was initiated by the French G20 Presidency. It
was the first time that academic researchers
have been invited to share their knowledge in
an exchange with G20 finance ministers, cen-
tral bank governors and their deputies.
Conference speakers included the Chinese
Vice-Premier Wang Qishan and the French
President Nicolas Sarkozy.
12 HOF-Newsletter  01.06.2011  22:26 Uhr  Seite 1415
Quarterly Event Calendar ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2011
QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
SEPTEMBER
Sunday, 4
th –  Verein für Socialpolitik
Wednesday, 7
th Annual Congress 2011  
“The order of the world economy: 
Lessons from the Crisis”
Wednesday, 7
th –  International Center for Insurance 
Thursday, 8
th Regulation 
“Transatlantic Insurance Group
Supervision”
Conference, organized by ICIR, EIOPA, NAIC
Wednesday, 7
th –  Goethe Business School 
Saturday, 10
th “Financial Risk Management – Part I”
Thursday, 8
th –  Seventh International Longevity Risks and
Friday, 9
th Capital Markets Solutions Conference 
Organization: Raimond Maurer
Tuesday, 20
th CFS Colloquium 
5.30 pm “Konvergenz internationaler Rechnungs-
legungsstandards und die Rolle des
Standard Setters”
Speaker: Clemens Börsig,
Chairman of the Supervisory Board, 
Deutsche Bank
Thursday, 22
th Center for Financial Studies 
11 am – 10.30 pm Deutsche Bank Prize Symposium and
Award Ceremony
Please refer to www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/eventlist.html
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
JULY
Friday, 1
st CFS Research Conference 
8.30 am – 7 pm “International Conference on Payout Policy –
Foundations and Trends”
Monday, 4
th EFL Jour Fixe
5 pm  “Measuring the Perceived Usefulness of
Corporate Communication Technologies 
in the Financial Services Industry”
Speaker: Sven Weber
Tuesday, 5
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics
12.15 pm – 1.45 pm  Speaker: Jaroslav Borovicka,
Chicago Fed / University of Chicago
Wednesday, 6
th  Finance Brown Bag Seminar 
12 pm – 1 pm “Corporate Cost of Borrowing: 
TRACE on Syndicated Loans”
Speaker: Markus Fischer
Thursday, 7
th Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 pm – 1.45 pm “Coordination Failures in Immigration
Policy”
Speaker: Michele Ruta, 
World Trade Organisation
Tuesday, 12
th Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm Speaker: Olesya V. Grishenko,
Smeal College of Business, Penn State University
Wednesday, 13
th Finance Brown Bag Seminar  
12 pm – 1 pm “The Role of Agents' Heterogeneity in
International Financial Markets and
Monetary Economics”
Speaker: Oliver Berndt
Thursday, 14
th MathFinance Kolloquium 
5.15   pm Speaker: Frank Riedel, University of Bielefeld
JULY
Saturday, 16
th Institute for Law and Finance  
6 pm Graduation Dinner
Friday, 29
th MathFinance Kolloquium  
2.30 pm Speaker: Jaksa Cvitanic, 
California Institute of Technology
AUGUST
Monday, 22
nd –  Ph.D. Program Law and Economics of 
Saturday, 27
th Money and Finance 
10 am – 6 pm, daily Summer School
“Empirical Law and Economics”
Speaker: Jonathan Klick, Davis Abrams,
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Monday, 22
nd –  Institute for Law and Finance 
September, Friday, 2
nd Summer School 
9 am – 5 pm daily “Banking and Capital Markets Law”
Wednesday, 31
st CFS Colloquium
5.30 pm “Die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des deutschen
Finanzsystems”
Speaker: Wolfgang Kirsch,
Chief Executive Officer, DZ Bank
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